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In September 2015, due to a specific political climate within EU institutions and member 
states, the EU Commission formulated a proposal to establish an investment court system 
(ICS) to be adopted in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The ICS was 
subsequently included in the agreements with Canada and Vietnam and has been tabled in the 
negotiations with Singapore and Japan. This Perspective addresses this bilateral ICS proposal 
and weighs it against the recent decision of the UN Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) to address investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS) reform.  
 
Firstly, in May 2017, the EU Court of Justice confirmed that any EU international investment 
agreements (IIAs) featuring ISDS fall outside the EU exclusive competence, thus requiring 
ratification by each member state. The Court’s opinion, which went against the position 
maintained by the Commission, complicates the emergence of a unified EU investment 
policy, including the ICS, delaying indefinitely the entry into force of those IIAs already (or 
about-to-be) concluded. Unable to rely on an operational ICS to buttress its proposal with 
other partners, the Commission appears poised since July 2017 to drop investment protection 
from trade deals altogether, from ongoing negotiations (Japan)
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 to new draft mandates 
(Australia, New Zealand).  
 
Secondly, recent IIAs introduced substantive limitations and clarifications aimed at shielding 
the exercise of state regulatory powers from qualifying as breaching foreign investors’ rights 
(e.g., rephrasing of clauses, explanatory/interpretive annexes, addition/expansion/refinement 
of exclusions, exceptions). This is evident too with regard to international arbitration, with 
roadblocks to its access strengthened and the interpretive freedom of arbitrators constrained. 
This conservative trend (seen also in the investment treaty practice of, for example, the 
Association of South East Asian Nations, China and the US) constitutes a proper response to 
real (or overstated) pitfalls of international arbitration. In light of the focus of IIAs on 
compensation (as opposed to compliance), the EU concerns over the appropriateness of 
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arbitration as a means to deal with public policy aspects and the ethics of arbitrators (conflict 
of interest, double hatting, etc.) seem disproportionate.  
 
Thirdly, keeping in mind that the EU is presently—if, perhaps, only formally—negotiating 
IIAs with the US and China, and that their cooperation is essential for the global reach of any 
ISDS reform, it appears that the ICS proposal is unsuited to their current stances on ISDS. 
The US is reportedly uninterested. China, besides currently emulating several US policy 
choices, is keen to protect its key investors abroad through the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes and international economic institutions (where China has 
recently become a major contributor) tied to it. Moreover, China may hardly be interested in 
institutionalizing a (semi-)permanent neutral international forum that would facilitate foreign 
investors’ claims against it.  
 
Fourthly, the ICS proposal seems ill-timed, because it dismisses the international 
community’s present stance vis-à-vis the creation of additional supranational adjudicatory 
bodies, especially by unilateral Western initiative (let alone in a perceived Western-based 
and/or driven international legal order). Indeed, several countries are expressing concerns 
about the legitimacy and/or cost of the existing mechanisms. Beside the failure of the mid-
1990s OECD-backed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, current major examples are the 
South China Sea UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) arbitration; the uneasy 
relationship between Russia and the European Court of Human Rights (and UNCLOS); and 
the relationship between several African countries and the International Criminal Court. On 
costs, the WTO Appellate Body’s repeated—and unfruitful—calls for an increase of its 
modest budget stand out.  
 
Fifthly, despite the EU attracting the world’s highest FDI inflows and stock, there are 
relatively few claims against its members (mostly, anyway, arising out of intra-EU 
investment disputes) and, especially, damages awarded–against its member states. 2  The 
Commission’s insistence on finding a procedural alternative to international arbitration seems 
an overreaction to domestic political shifts within EU members and vocal criticism from 
interest groups, including NGOs. 
 
To conclude, the bilateral ICS initiative seems overly focused on EU interests and concerns, 
and thus is counterproductive to the goal of global ISDS reform. Multilateral discussions in 
UNCITRAL may facilitate, conversely, consensus on shared and far-reaching reforms, but 
they are unthinkable without the participation of new geopolitical heavyweights like India 
and Brazil. There, building on more than two decades of experience with investment 
arbitration, and benefitting from recent contributions of renowned experts,
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 questions other 
than bilateral or multilateral courts may be dealt with (like sustainability, investment 
facilitation, investor obligations, arbitrators’ ethic). Steps forward are possible, as the recent 
adoption of the Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking by the G20 
demonstrates,
4
 considering that current Western concerns over the sovereign exercise of 
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